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Introduction 
 
Becker’s analysis of marriage (1973, 1974) is built on the hypothesis that the social 
process by which men and women meet is a market phenomenon, implying both material and 
psychological gains for (potential) partners. This market, frequently referred to the “marriage 
market”, can be analyzed by defining social relationships as a special case of consumer 
behavior. Levy and Zaltman (1975) have termed exchanges on this market “intimate 
marketing”. One of the most cited papers on this issue is that of Hirschman (1987), who 
analyzed the behavior of advertisers using “lonely hearts” columns. Hirschman’s analysis of 
dating advert users explores the role of consumption in human courtship and the idea of 
“marital exchange” through the developments of the theory of resource exchange (Foa, 1976). 
Hirschman deals with the demand for partners in terms of the Lancaster’s economic theory of 
consumer behavior (1966). Each potential partner is treated as a bundle of characteristics, 
including age, level of education, physical appearance and intelligence among others. 
Consumption of these characteristics during the dating process will, to some extent, be a form 
of leisure. 
Becker’s seminal analysis of marriage (see Grossbard-Shechtman, 1995, 2003) has 
been followed by a number of works looking at the economics of the partner selection process 
more generally. There is empirical work on personal advertisements by Cameron and Collins 
(1997, 1999, 2000a, 2000b) and on marriage bureaux- Le Guirriec and Vaillant (2005), 
Cameron and Vaillant (2006). Using data from a speed-dating experiment, where random 
matching of subjects were generated, Fisman et al. (2006) show that women put greater 
weight on the intelligence and race of partners, while men respond more to physical 
attractiveness. Moreover, men do not value women's intelligence or ambition when it exceeds 
their own and women exhibit a preference for men who grew up in affluent neighborhoods. 
Finally, male selectivity is invariant to group size, contrary to female selectivity. In another 
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contribution, Fisman et al. (2008) extend their findings by examining racial preferences in 
dating. Gender, but also subjects’ backgrounds, age and physical appearance seem to affect 
racial preferences.  
Partner selection occurs naturally and informally, but it may also be organized through 
commercial intermediaries facilitating mating and dating (Quah, 1990, Vaillant, 2004a). 
According to Ahuvia and Adelman (1992), people who use commercial intermediaries do so 
in exchange for three services: i) searching, i.e. defining who are potential mates; ii) 
matching, i.e. obtaining information about the potential right partners; and iii) interaction, i.e. 
interacting in order to form or reject a relationship. Matchmaking agencies, personal 
advertisements and online dating services allow individuals to reduce the extensive costs of 
mate search, by locating easily potential partners (Vaillant, 2004b). Therefore, weighting 
costs and benefits, individuals with a relatively high income level experience substantial 
opportunity costs by searching for the right mate (Gronau, 1977). They are more likely to use 
commercial intermediaries to reduce them, except if their high opportunity cost is more than 
compensated by a rich social life. Indeed, networks increase their pool of potential partners, 
especially when they seek partners with similar professional characteristics (Batabyal, 2001).  
Furthermore, people who are characterized by features of low market value, or people 
who are picky about their prospective partners are more likely to buy matchmaking services 
of one sort or another. Speed-dating drastically reduces searching and matching costs, by 
eliminating a large amount of leisure interaction per date. Moreover, it greatly increases the 
number of dates per unit of effort. It might then be aimed at increasing the efficiency of dating 
leisure by attempting to increase matching. 
Recent institutional, technical and social changes have altered the pool of individuals 
looking for dates, at all ages and at different moments in their lives (Stevenson and Wolfers, 
2007). In particular, the rise in household appliances over the last century have made leisure 
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and consumption complementarities more important drivers of couple matching than the 
production capabilities emphasized by Becker (1981). Gould and Paserman (2003) argue that 
rising wage inequalities have increased the return of a partner search and decreased the value 
of remaining unmarried. Caucutt et al. (2002) claim that rising returns to labor market 
experience raise the incentive for highly educated women to develop stronger prospects in 
both the labor and marriage markets.  
With the increasing value of the search of a partner, online dating becomes more and 
more attractive. David Evans, an online dating consultant, estimates at 30 million the number 
of persons that will log on in 2009 to one of the 1500 estimated online dating services in the 
United States. European Internet users are far more engaged in online dating than those in 
North America. According to ComScore World Metrix, 18 percent of European Internet users 
(38.2 millions) visit online personals sites each month (in 2006). France, Germany and 
England represent the largest market shares. According to JupiterResearch, online dating 
services are the third largest attractor in Internet users for paid content, after music and 
games, earning ten percent of the online audience in 2007. Online search offers a larger set of 
potential partners and anonymity than offline search. Those facing difficulties meeting 
potential mates are more likely to use Internet. Online search also allows for the selection of 
partners with similar leisure preferences (for example, with the use of conditions “must love 
travel”). 
Clearly, people using online services may be distinguished according to at least two 
categories: candidates for marriage who are involved in mating rather than dating on the one 
hand, i.e. people who are trying to “invest” in marriage; individuals who have short-run 
intentions on the other hand, i.e. people trying to “consume” human relationships. Thus, the 
continued existence of online dating services simply reaffirms that it meets the needs of 
individuals of both categories. 
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From an economic viewpoint, time devoted to dating can be analyzed either as a cost 
for individuals who are searching to marry, or reciprocally as a consumption good for dating 
consumers, insofar as this activity provides in itself satisfaction. In the first case, the cost can 
be both explicit, subscriptions to an online site or restaurant expenses for example, and 
implicit (since time spent on dating cannot be devoted to paid work (it is leisure time). In the 
second case, dating is consumption good, a form of leisure. Of course, other activities can 
serve as substitute or complement to dating activities (such as social networks, hotline, sex 
toys, porn movies…), but their impact on dating is not discussed here. 
 In this chapter, we specifically consider individuals who express a demand for dates. 
The remainder of our text is organized as follows. In the next Section, we present a theoretical 
model of dating behavior explaining why improved economic conditions may have 
ambiguous effects on dating. We turn to an empirical analysis in Section 2. Using a vector 
error correction model and original French time series data, we investigate the relationship 
between online dating, the economic sentiment (a proxy for economic wealth and people 
confidence in the future) and decrease in dating opportunities (measured by the lagged 
fertility rate). Concluding comments are in Section 3. 
 
1. The economics of dating 
To explain optimal investment in dating activities by individuals, we turn to the 
expected utility theory and consider a simple microeconomic model of time allocation à la 
Gronau (1977). Dating is viewed as an additional possible time use, which extends the usual 
tradeoff between leisure and working activities. The model could be modified to consider not 
only the implicit cost of dating (time), but also the associated expenses. Here, instead the 
latter are pulled with private consumption without allowing any distinction on marginal utility 
for different expenses. For example, one euro spent on a movie or visit to the theatre may (or 
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may not) bring the same marginal utility than one euro spent in a bar, but here the marginal 
utility is treated as identical. 
 
1.1. The model 
 
We assume that there are only two states of the world in our model: either the 
representative agent is successful in meeting singles (state s ), or he/she is unsuccessful (state 
u ). Let q  be the probability of the « bad » outcome, so that q1  is the probability 
associated to s . Whatever the outcome, the individual level of utility U  is expected to 
depend on his/her level of private consumption C , on leisure l  and on the number of 
potential partners met ( uD  or sD ). We denote respectively ),,(
ss DlCU  and ),,(
uu DlCU the 
individual utility functions in both states
1
. The individual’s expected level of utility EU  may 
be expressed as: 
 
),,(.),,(.)1( uuss DlCUqDlCUqEU            (1) 
 
We assume that the numbers of meetings in successful and unsuccessful situations 
(respectively sD  and uD ) are affected by time spent in dating activity. We rely on the 
following parametric specification:  
 
Ds n0 N(d)                (2) 
Du n0                 (3) 
where n0  is an exogenous variable reflecting the number of random meetings, independently 
on the effort of the agent.  
1
 These utility functions are supposed to be continuous and twice differentiable. 
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With more time spent in dating (denoted by d ), the individual is expected to meet 
more potential partners. We rely in the sequel on decreasing returns for these dating activities, 
i.e. the dating technology is concave ( 0'N  and 0''N ). 
Let us now turn to the individual resources constraints. First, the total amount of time 
T  is devoted to hours of work h , leisure l  and dating activities d , so that dlhT . 
Second, there is the standard budget constraint such that the individual devotes his/her income 
to private consumption C  (prices being normalized to one). There are two sources of 
earnings: labor income hw. , with w  the hourly wage rate, and an exogenous non-labor 
income Y  (including bequests or public transfers for instance)2. From the corresponding 
constraint yhwC .  and using the time constraint, we get the following full-budget 
constraint: 
 
yTwdwlwC ...              (4) 
 
The maximum attainable level of income is given by YyTw. . From (4), it is clear 
that the opportunity cost of one hour spent in dating activities and the opportunity cost of 
leisure are similar, given by the wage rate.  
The problem for the consumer is hence to maximize his/her expected utility level by 
choosing the amount of time to spend in dating and leisure. Formally, the optimization 
problem is: 
 
),,..(.)](,,..[.)1(max , nldwlwYUqdNnldwlwYUqEU
us
dl      (5) 
 
In what follows, we denote by 
S
iU  and 
u
iU  respectively the first-derivative of the 
2
 Note that we do not account for the potential income of the spouse in case of a successful meeting. 
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individual utility function, evaluated respectively at sD  and uD  with respect to the i th 
argument, with 3,2,1i . The utility functions are supposed to be strictly quasi-concave, i.e., 
0
S
iU , 0
u
iU  and 0
S
iiU , 0
u
iiU  (with 3,2,1i ). We further assume some 
complementary between private consumption and the time inputs ( 01
S
iU , 01
u
iU , 3,2i ), 
but some substituability between the time inputs l  and d  ( 023
s
U , 023
u
U ).  
The corresponding first-order conditions 0/ lEU  and 0/ dEU  are: 
 
0).(.).(.)1( 2121
uuss UUwqUUwq            (6) 
0).(.)'.(.)1( 131
uss
UwqUNUwq            (7) 
 
The interpretation of these conditions is as follows. From (6), the marginal expected 
cost of one hour of leisure in terms of foregone income (1 q) w U1
s q w U1
u  is equal to 
its marginal expected benefit us UqUq 22 ..)1(  since utility is increasing with leisure. From 
(7), the marginal expected cost of one hour spent in dating activities (1 q) w U1
s q w U1
u  
is equal to its marginal expected benefit 
s
UNq 3'.)1( . Combining (6) and (7) leads to: 
 
sus
UNqUqUq 322 '.)1(.)(.)1(             (8) 
 
Equation (8) means that the marginal expected benefit from one hour of leisure 
us UqUq 22 .)(.)1(  should be equal to the marginal expected benefit from one hour spent in 
dating activities 
s
UNq 3'.)1(  at the equilibrium. When this equality does not hold, a better 
outcome can be reached by reallocating time between leisure and dating. 
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1.2. Economic conditions and dating 
 
We are interested in the comparative static properties of the model in order to know 
the impact of a change in the exogenous income Y  and the wage rate w  on both the optimal 
amounts of leisure and dating. From the second-order derivatives, it can be shown that the 
derivatives Yd /  and wd /  can be either positive or negative. As in standard models of 
time allocation, the impact of a change in the individual level of income on dating activities 
will be given by the sum of a substitution effect and an income effect.  
Consider an agent with little economic resources and consider an increase in his/her 
wage rate. The substitution effect will first dominate and the individual will increase his/her 
number of hours worked. This mechanically reduces time devoted to dating, especially if 
dating and other leisure are complementary goods. Now, with a substantial rise in income, the 
income effect is expected to be larger than the substitution effect. The additional utility gained 
from an extra hour of dating become greater than the utility derived from the additional 
income earned, and more effort will be devoted to dating activities. Note that this marginal 
benefit also depends on the effectiveness of the dating activity, measured through the shape of 
the dating technology (.)N .  
The relationship of online dating with the business cycle is not documented either. 
During a recession, people tend to rethink their priorities. It is true in business, but also in the 
personal live sphere. The need to get through it together, to feel part of a community, to create 
social and affective links, can be stronger in difficult periods. Moreover, for those looking for 
a mate, the perspective of income and risk pooling may also be an incentive during economic 
slowdown. In an article published in the New York Time, Ellin (2009) reports that dating 
interest is up, both with online and offline matchmakers, during the fourth quarter of 2008 (in 
a recession). Schwartz, a professor of sociology and the relationship expert at 
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perfectmatch.com, reports a 51 percent increase in new members in the fourth quarter of 2008 
compared to 2007. During the previous economic downturn in 2001, a similar increased 
interest for dating was observed. With the average cost of offline dating being higher than the 
monthly cost to online dating, both the substitution and income effects tend to encourage 
online dating compared to dating during hardship. Unemployed and underemployed people, 
with more time on their hands, can devote more time surfing the web.  
At the same time, it is also possible that during economic recession, people feel less 
confident and that, as a result, socialization and in particular dating are less successful. Dating 
(online or otherwise) may hence be correlated in a complex way with the income level as we 
just discussed, but also with the level of uncertainty, the attitude of people and their 
confidence. It follows that the sign of the correlation between the business cycle and online 
dating remains ambiguous even if anecdotal evidence suggests a negative correlation between 
online dating and the wealth of the economy.  
 
 
2. The empirical model 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on a time series analysis. We use a French monthly 
dataset covering the period from January 2004 to August 2008 (56 observations). Specifically, 
we focus on the relationships between demand for dating (MEETIC), economic sentiment 
(ESI) and a proxy of the decrease in dating opportunities (measured by the lagged fertility rate 
denoted invOP) in France.  
 
2.1. Data 
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In order to test the relationship between online dating and income, one could use 
micro data with information on time (and more generally financial resources) allocation 
between work, consumption and dating as well as information about wealth and labour 
income. Such data have never been collected as far as we know. Alternatively, we may rely 
on macro data, which will be relevant to assess the relationship between confidence and the 
business cycle. By adding other variables, we could extend the analysis to other covariates. 
For example, it would be interesting to study the link between dating interest, confidence and 
sexual health (STIs, HIV, AIDS, pregnancies). Using data from the San Francisco Stop Aids 
Project, Geoffard and Méchoulan (2004) show that improvements in treatments against HIV 
(in 1996) provoked an increase in the risk level, by diminishing the cost associated with risk 
for those individuals who have opted for testing. Therefore, although they studied the 
relationship between sexual health and one aspect of confidence (confidence in physicians 
competence which may also maybe reflect a general form of optimism), they did not study the 
relationship with dating interest. Such a work will be interested to carry on. 
Existing surveys provide some descriptive statistics, but do not offer any analysis and 
explanations. For instance, the Durex Sexual Well being Global Survey presents findings 
from 26 countries every year, investigating people's attitudes to sex. Since 2005, Durex 
Company also publishes yearly reports called “Face of global sex”, with a different question 
each year. In 2008, directly relevant to a study that would investigate confidence, dating 
interest and sexual health, the focus was on confidence. A sexual confidence scale assesses 
confidence aspects of sexual health (avoiding STIs/HIV/AIDS and pregnancy) as well as 
other dimensions of confidence, i.e. sexual fulfillment and where to find guidance on various 
sexual issues. 
 
2.2. The endogenous covariates 
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The variable MEETIC was built using http://www.google.fr/trends, which counts the 
number of times the word “MEETIC” has been searched on google over one month period. 
“Meetic” is the dating site by far the most viewed in Europe and France
3
. Interestingly, the 
use of online web search queries, submitted daily by millions of users around the world, is 
employed by public health specialists to monitor health-seeking behavior. Indeed, the relative 
frequency of certain queries (for example, cough) is highly correlated with the percentage of 
physician visits for that condition (that is to say, for cough in the example). 
Economic conditions are captured by the economic sentiment indicator of consumers 
from the “Joint Harmonised EU Programme of Business and Consumer Surveys” (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/documents/userguide_en.pdf).  
About 40 000 consumers are currently surveyed across the EU. Answers obtained from these 
questions are aggregated in the form of “balances” which are constructed as the difference 
between the percentages of respondents giving positive and negative replies. The Commission 
calculates confidence indicators as arithmetic means of answers (seasonally adjusted 
balances) to a selection of questions related to the confidence indicator they are supposed to 
monitor. Sentiment indices are widely believed to have predictive power for the performance 
of the macroeconomy. Some empirical support for this belief is provided by research findings, 
which indicate that the sentiment index contains information about future changes in the 
economy beyond what is contained in past values of other available indicators (Carroll et al., 
1994, Ludvigson, 2004). 
Finally, dating also depends on the opportunities of success (correlated with the 
number of people looking for a date). As a proxy for the decrease opportunities of dating 
(invOP) in France, we use the t-9 month rate of fecundity. We can reasonably think that a 
3
 See http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/feb2005/nf2005028_4806_db089.htm or for a more recent 
source: http://www.onlinepersonalswatch.com/files/meetic_res-q309_vfengfinale.pdf . 
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woman who is pregnant is less likely to look for a date. Therefore, when the share of pregnant 
woman increases, the share of single women looking for a date is decreasing. This proxy 
variable does not take into account the proportion of male that are available, but since two 
persons are needed for a date, it is related to the availability of possible matches. It should be 
kept in mind that this remains only an approximation. According to data from Forrester 
Research, over one-third of those using online dating are currently married. Hence, we cannot 
rule out that some of them may be married with women that are expecting a baby. 
All of the variables were expressed as logarithms and seasonally adjusted. Note that 
we add +38 to each observation of the economic indicator, insofar as it presents negative 
values (min(ESI)=-37). Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the various variables. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
When studying times series, we need to know first of all if the variables are integrated 
or not. If they are integrated of the same order, a stable long-run relationship may exist which 
can be taken into acount using error correction models. We therefore apply tests of unit roots 
to establish the order of integration in each of the four variables. Specifically, we turn to the 
unit root test developed by Phillips and Perron (1988). Basically, the Phillips–Perron test is a 
modification of the standard test proposed by Dickey and Fuller (1979). The Phillips–Perron 
test estimates the Dickey–Fuller test and modifies the t-ratio of the unit root coefficient so that 
serial correlation does not affect the test statistic. Table 1 presents the results for the unit root 
test for a model with an intercept. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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The variables log(MEETIC) and log(ESI) appear to be non-stationary in levels, and 
stationary when differenced. In other words, we can conclude that these series are integrated 
of order one (I(1)). The Phillips–Perron on the variable log(invOP) rejects the existence of a 
unit root. We thus conduct a Dickey-Fuller GLS test, which is a modified Dickey-Fuller t-test 
for a unit root in which the series have been transformed by a generalized least-squares 
regression. The DF-GLS statistic for the series does not exceed the critical values in absolute 
terms at the 1% level of significance (-2.36>-2.62). When we take the first difference of each 
variable, it does, which means that log(invOP) is integrated of order one (or I(1)). 
 
2.3. A VECM approach 
 
The results described above indicate that there may be one or several stable long-run 
relationships between the variables and that we should test for cointegration before specifying 
the multivariate model. The concept of cointegration was formalized by Engle and Granger 
(1987). We say that variables are cointegrated when we can form a linear combination of 
them that is stationary, this linear combination can be considered as a long-run relationship 
between the variables. If one or several cointegrating relationships are identified in a 
multivariate system, the long-run relationship can be included as error correction terms in the 
vector autoregressive setup. Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen (Johansen, 1988, 
Johansen and Juselius, 1990) tests can be used to determine the number of relations of 
cointegration. The latter is often preferred due to its one-step approach and its ability to 
handle more than one cointegrating relationship. Another drawback with the original Engle 
and Granger test is the importance of the choice of dependent variables. In the Johansen test, 
it is assumed that all variables are endogenous and the test is therefore not sensitive to 
structure choice. 
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Before performing the Johansen procedure, it is necessary to specify the lag length of 
the vector auto-regressive model. The results of diagnostic tests proposed by Sims (1980) are 
shown in Table 2. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
The final prediction error (FPE), the Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion 
(SBIC), the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC) and the Akaike's information 
criterion (AIC) indicate vector autoregressions of order 1, whereas the likelihood-ratio test 
statistics (LR)  concludes to a four lag-order. Both lag 1 and lag 4 will be considered in the 
Johansen procedure, but we only report the results for four lags. The Johansen procedure 
produces Trace and Maximum Eigen-value tests presented in Table 3 from which the number 
of cointegrating vectors can be identified. We proceed sequentially by first testing for H0: r 
0, with r the number of cointegrating vectors. If H0 is rejected, we then test for r  1 and so 
on until the null hypothesis could not be rejected. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The Johansen procedure clearly rejects the null hypothesis of zero cointegrating vector 
against the alternative, at both 1% and 5% levels when considering only one lag in the 
underlying VAR model (results are not presented). Table 3 indicates that the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration relation cannot be rejected at 1%, but is rejected at 5% in favor of at most 
one statistically significant cointegrating vector. Considering the results of the Johansen 
procedure that rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration relation at 5% (with one or four 
lags), we will consider a model with four lags and one relation of cointegration.  
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The dating equation is identified by normalizing the estimated coefficient on 
log(MEETIC) to 1. The estimated relation of cointegration is (with standard errors in 
parentheses under the coefficients) : 
 
log MEETIC 124.72 2.97
0.073
log ESI 44.60
0.000
log invOP        (9) 
where the vector of coefficients represents the cointegrating vector defining the linear 
combination of variables that are I(0). There can be described as long-run equilibrium.  
 
First, the dating demand is negatively related both to the economic sentiment and the 
fertility rate, which indicates that it is positively related with the number of potential partners. 
The estimated coefficient associated to log(ESI) indicates that a 1% increase in ESI will 
decrease the demand for dating by 3% in the long run. When people are more confident in the 
economy and have more income, they tend to spend less time on meetic. On the contrary, 
during economic downturns, they appear to increase their demand for online dating.  
Our results are consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting that some people have 
more time to invest in online dating (those that are not employed full time) and that the 
marginal utility of dating increases during economic recession (“people want to go through it 
together”). Besides, the dating demand increases with the number of potential partners : the 
latter raises the marginal utility of dating, which can explain why it becomes more attractive 
to invest in dating
4
.  
The next stage consists in studying the nature of the short-run relationship using a 
VECM. In this representation, short-run fluctuations are represented with the lagged first 
differences. Any changes in the dependent variables are a function of the level of 
disequilibrium in the cointegration relationships (measured with the error correction term ect):  
4
 When estimating a model with one lag and one cointegration relation, we reach very similar conclusions. 
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Meetict aMeetic bi,Meetic
i 1
4
Meetict i ci ,Meetic
i 1
4
ESIt i di ,Meetic
i 1
4
invOPt i  
eMeeticectt 1 1t           (10) 
invOPPt aMeetic bi,invOPP
i 1
4
Meetict i ci ,invOPP
i 1
4
ESIt i di ,invOPP
i 1
4
invOPt i  
einvOPPectt 1 2t           (11) 
ESIt aESI bi,ESI
i 1
4
Meetict i ci,ESI
i 1
4
ESIt i di,ESI
i 1
4
invOPt i  
eESIectt 1 3t           (12) 
where ectt-1 is the lagged error correction term and the vector e represents the weight or 
adjustment speed. In other words, it measures how fast the stationary variable ectt-1 feedbacks 
onto the system. The t  are serially independent errors with mean zero and finite covariance 
matrix.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 presents estimates of the short-run equations (10), (11) and (12). We can 
observe that the demand for meetic and the fertility rate appear to be the variables that adjust 
to any disequilibrium from the long-run relation (through the error correction term) at the 
previous period. Standard Granger-type causality tests can be performed in an ECM. 
Following Granger (1969), ESI causes InvOP if the prediction of InvOP is improved when 
including past values of ESI than when not including them. In the short-run, the t-test applied 
to the lag of each explanatory variable in each of the three equations indicates the statistical 
significance of the short-run causal effects (and the strict Granger exogeneity or endogeneity 
of the dependent variables).  
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Here, the variable ESI is deemed to cause InvOP if one or more of the lagged 
coefficient of ESI is statistically different from zero. Our data suggests that this is indeed the 
case. In other words, when economic agents are optimist about the economy, the fertility rate 
tends to increase and the opportunities of dating falls. The other variables appear to be strictly 
exogenous to each other. Again, this result is robust to other specifications, for instance the 
one including a model with one lag and one cointegration relation.  
 
 
3. Discussion and concluding comments 
With some exceptions, little attention has been paid to the question of time devoted to 
a partner choice. However, recent institutional, technical and social changes have altered the 
pool of individuals looking for dates, at all ages and at different moments in their lives. It 
should renew the interest for research on partner choices and the time devoted to it. 
Search models, risk-pooling models and expected utility models of arbitrage between 
working time and leisure focus on different dimensions of choice of the individual. In 
particular, the first two can explain the different mechanisms that tend to extend the search 
period and that modify the costs and benefits of marriage (or cohabitation). Rising returns to 
labour market experience raises the incentive for highly educated women of search to develop 
stronger prospects in both the labor and the marriage market. If individuals view marriage as 
an insurance against income risks, those who are more risk tolerant will accept to delay 
marriage. But clearly, not all people using online services are looking for a life partner. The 
motivations are therefore very different from the ones just traditionally analyzed. To take into 
account both forms of dating, we use a model where the time has to be allocated between 
leisure and work. We have chosen to explore this last dimension, which was yet to be 
explored, by focusing on one growing form of partner search: online dating.  
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In this work, we seek to understand the relationship, if any, between dating and the 
business cycle, and more exactly between online dating and the business cycle. Online search 
offers a larger set of potential partners and anonymity than offline search. Moreover, it is 
likely to become more attractive in an economic recession as the former appears as a cheaper 
substitute to the latter. 
We rely on a simple microeconomic model of time allocation. Dating is viewed as an 
additional possible time use, which extends the usual tradeoff between leisure and working 
activities. As in standard models of time allocation, the impact of a change in the individual 
level of income on dating activities is given by the sum of a substitution effect and an income 
effect. Hence, in general, we cannot predict the direction of the effect of a change in the 
economic sentiment on the demand for dating.   In simple microeconomic models where 
workers are supposed to choose their hours, the relationship between time devoted to dating 
and income should be U-shaped. What should happen then in aggregate under real world 
conditions? From our own viewpoint, additional issues should lead to a much more complex, 
undetermined relationship. As a matter of fact, the marginal utility of dating for an individual 
also depends on the effectiveness of the dating activities, on its risk aversion, on its own risk 
of income variation and on its desire to pool risk with a mate among other factors. 
The economic theory is therefore not able to predict the effect of a recession for the 
industry of online dating, as we could for a traditional normal good or inferior good. It is 
therefore interesting to explore empirically this question and to study whether, as reported in 
newspapers, economic recession tend to stimulate the online dating industry on the aggregate.  
For that purpose, we have used monthly observations covering the period from 
January 2004 to August 2008 on the demand for online dating in France through the MEETIC 
website, on the economic sentiment (ESI) and on a proxy of the rate of missed opportunities 
of dating (invOP) in France through the lagged fertility rate. The results are as follows. The 
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three series are integrated of order one. One relation of cointegration is identified, which can 
be described as a long-run equilibrium between the three variables. The dating demand is 
negatively related to both the economic sentiment and the fertility rate. So, during economic 
downturns, people appear to increase their demand for online dating, which is consistent with 
anedoctal evidences suggesting that some people have more time to invest in online dating 
and that the marginal utility of dating increases during economic recession. In conclusion, our 
empirical tests indicate that for the last recession the demand for online dating increased with 
the deterioration of the economic sentiment in the long-run trend. But nothing can be said 
about short-run fluctuations around the equilibrium, regarding the relationship between the 
economic sentiment and the demand for dating. To conclude, our empirical analysis shows 
that during the last recession, the demand for online dating has increased with the 
deterioration of the economic sentiment in the long-run trend. However, nothing can be said 
about short-run fluctuations around the equilibrium, regarding the relationship between the 
economic sentiment and the demand for dating. Our study offers a first investigation of this 
interesting and puzzling question of the effect of the income on the demand for dating. More 
work needed on this topic to better understand how income may have an impact on the 
demand for dating, both theoretically and empirically. It would be worthwhile to collect both 
macro data in order to predict long-term trends for the dating industry, but also micro data on 
both users and non-users of these online dating services. This would allow to shed light on the 
selection process into online dating and to better understand individual strategies to find a 
partner through these services. All these issues are of interest for future work. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Demand for dating, economic sentiment and the inverse of the available opportunities of dates. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (whole sample) 
   
PP 
(level) 
 PP 
(1st diff.) 
 
 Mean SD Z (rho) Z (t) Z (rho) Z (t) 
Log(Meetic) 0.907 0.332 -4.833 -2.218 -57.122 -7.283*** 
Log(ESI) 2.960 0.690 -5 -1.426 -80.682 -10.374*** 
Log(OPP) 2.547 0.026 -27.298 -4.093*** -68.665 -9.445*** 
Significant at the one percent level (***). 
 
Table 2. Length of the vector auto-regressive model. 
lag LL LR df P FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 150.571    0.000 -4.703 -4.222 -3.4409 
1 263.565 225.990 9.000 0.000 3.0e-08* -8.8626* -8.25099* -7.2565* 
2 270.518 13.905 9.000 0.126 0.000 -8.781 -8.038 -6.83044   
3 274.586 8.137 9.000 0.520 0.000 -8.583 -7.710 -6.28902 
4 283.074 16.975* 9.000 0.049 0.000 -8.563 -7.558 -5.92435 
5 286.843 7.538 9.000 0.581 0.000 -8.354 -7.218 -5.37095 
6 292.385 11.086 9.000 0.270 0.000 -8.215 -6.949 -4.8885 
Significant at the ten percent level (*). 
 
Table 3. Johansen procedure (with constant in cointegration) 
No. of cointegrating vectors Eigenvalue Trace test 
  r = 2 (alternative: r = 3) 0.04326 2.299 
  r = 1 (alternative: r = 2) 0.16222 11.504* 
  r = 0 (alternative: r = 1) 0.30487 30.414* 
Significant at the ten percent level (*). 
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Table 4. VECM estimation results 
 D(Log(LMEETIC)) D(log(invOP)) D(log(LESI)) 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
       
CE -0.027 0.074 -0.013 0.000*** 0.010 0.600 
D(Log(MEETIC))       
  t-1 0.010 0.946 -0.009 0.807 0.144 0.441 
  t-2 -0.090 0.577 -0.188 0.631 -0.077 0.690 
  t-3 0.031 0.847 -0.056 0.158 0.221 0.258 
  t-4 0.081 0.625 -0.030 0.458 0.271 0.179 
       
D(Log(ESI))       
  t-1 -0.558 0.404 -0.020 0.901 -0.580 0.474 
  t-2 0.594 0.378 0.257 0.121 -0.612 0.452 
  t-3 0.358 0.591 0.374 0.022** -1.010 0.210 
  t-4 0.924 0.144 0.174 0.262 -0.097 0.899 
       
D(Log(invOP))       
  t-1 -0.027 0.849 0.018 0.596 -0.027 0.873 
  t-2 -0.035 0.790 0.093 0.004*** -0.055 0.729 
  t-3 0.009 0.948 0.088 0.013** 0.057 0.744 
  t-4 -0.008 0.956 0.034 0.355 0.096 0.599 
       
Intercept -0.002 0.900 -0.004 0.197 -0.011 0.514 
R-squared 0.300  0.4436  0.1474  
Chi-squared 15.854 0.322 29.501 0.009 6.397 0.955 
Significant at the one percent level (***). 
Significant at the five percent level (**). 
 
 
 
